vraag1: nash evenwicht:

	enter / not enter
accommodate:	2, 2 4, 0
deter	: 0, -3 1,

A) als het gelijke keuze maken is ... en apart AE 1x
B) 2 keer AE als Nash 12x
C) D,NE als ze simultaan kiezen; D,NE als eerst firm 1 kiest en dan firm 2

vraag 2: gegeven grafiek price setting, MC2 < MC1

- p1 =p2 zetten om winst van bedrijf 2 te maximaliseren
- P2 net onder p1 zetten
- MC2=MR2 x9

vraag 3: when is a horizontal merge betweeen 2 firms profitable for the third firm?

- never
- if they compete in price 2X
- if they compete in quantity 3x (op de ppt staat letterlijk enkel positive externality als die competen in quantity)
- both 6x

vraag 4: 2 firms in the market with transport costs, choose their location and price, they:

- located far from each other, no profit x1
- located far from each other, both profit>0 x12
- located near each other, no profit
- located near each other, both profit>0

vraag 5: not necessary for predatory pricing

- incumbent company has a competitive advantage
- incumbent company can tolerate losses in the short run
- incumbent company has a history starting a price war 11x
- entrant has budget restrictions? 1x

vraag 6: juiste stelling kiezen:

- collusion is not possible with more than 3 firms
- collusion is not possible if the companies have heterogeneous costs
- collusion is more likely if discount factor is large 8x

vraag 7: juiste stelling kiezen:

- with capacity constraints the bertrand trap cannot be escaped
- in the price setting, prices are strategic substitutes
- if the MC of 1 firm knows a sudden high increase, there is no bertrand trap anymore X12

vraag 8: foute stelling kiezen (stelling van RPM is meer fout maar die van horizontal merger is toch ook niet helemaal correct? Ja awel! Das toch beide fout

- horizontal merge is always profitable for consumers x2
- RPM increases price competition between retailers, so that they can invest more in advertising,customer service,... 8x

vraag 9: entrant makes a big investment in advertising in price setting game, what is false

- if advertising has no spillovers, bedrijf 1 must overinvest to accommodate the entrant x8
- if advertising has no spillovers, must overinvest to deter the entrant
- if advertising has positive spillovers, must underinvest to deter entry
- the investment makes them look soft, the must overinvest to accommodate entry 1x

vraag 10: Stackelberg, quantity setting

- leader will set higher prices and higher quantities
- leader will set lower prices and higher quantities
- leader will set the same price as follower, but will set higher quantities x11
- leader will set the same price as follower, but will set lower quantities

vraag 11: nieuw bedrijf in de markt, quantity setting(cournot)

- de prijs vóór de entry is hoger dan in een perfect competitieve setting, en doordat de entrant in de markt komt zal de individuele output per onderneming afnemen 4x

vraag 12: tabel met dorfman steiner dinges

- bier moet prijs omhoog doen want lage prijs elasticiteit
- toothpaste gaat het meeste investeren in advertising
- bier gaat het minste investeren in advertising
- toothpaste moet meeste investeren om winst te maximaliseren x7

vraag 13: welke stelling is fout

- als competitie stijgt, zorgt replacement effect voor daling innovatie x9
- als competitie stijgt, zorgt efficiency effect voor stijging innovatie